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Abstract 
The legal understanding of personhood is dynamic and evolves through the ages. This paper shows 
how a contemporary shift, under the influence of, inter alia, the law of the European Union, provides 
an unexpected excursion into the past, reminiscent as it is of some pre-modern approaches, thus 
showing deep-rooted conflicts between how the Union operates and the classical ideology of demos, 
democracy and citizenship. The fact that this is undoubtedly inadvertent does not alter the outcomes of 
this process. The new individualism, which the EU tacitly promotes with all its accidental 
cosmopolitanism is presented here as neo-mediaevalism. The core distinction at the heart of such legal 
paradigm of personhood is between the free and unfree; the core moral value is the precise 
apportionment of liberty among the persons in accordance with their legally recognisable chance and 
circumstance. This paradigm of personhood, which is essentially private, not public in nature, almost 
became extinct in contemporary world with the advent of democracy, equality, and the status of 
citizenship based on the citizen/foreigner distinction. This is what the EU now happens to be reviving. 
As a result, equality is not treated as a value — not even as a starting presumption; — community does 
not build on the idea of sovereignty and submission; and liberty is detached from the political realm 
and does not imply collective self-determination. 
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 1 
I. Introduction: the usefulness of amusing tales 
 
The most crucial paradigm shift in the last millennium’s law of personhood brilliantly documented by 
Keechang Kim, reached the very core of understanding of equality, liberty and community.
1
 
Personhood moved from the realm of private to public law, as the core border of personhood drifted 
from free/unfree to citizen/foreigner, this change bringing with it the necessity of a presumption of 
equality, thus removing the long-dominant moral ideal of inequality from its pedestal, and the idea of 
liberty through submission to the sovereign. In its place came political community, which later became 
one of the core elements of democracy. The EU is very affective in seriously undermining, if not 
undoing this ages-old development, as this chapter will demonstrate. 
The mediaeval paradigm shift behind what still officially informs our approach to personhood 
in law was distilled in all clarity in the famous Calvin case,
2
 where the Law Lords, for the first time in 
history, connected allegiance with natural law, as opposed to simply the law of the land, thus 
mandating equal protection of the law extending, by virtue of such allegiance, to all the subjects of the 
King: ‘the law is equal and favoureth not’.3 They thereby allowed a Scot born under James Stuart, the 
first King of both England and Scotland, to inherit property in England as if he were an Englishman.
4
 
Allegiance amounted to a totally new kind of bond compared with the Roman and early-mediaeval 
understandings of personhood and shows how much the presumptions of what it means to be a person 
in the eyes of the law have changed from the Roman law on personal status and the evolution of its 
vestiges in the Middle Ages to the seventeenth century understanding. The change marked a full-
blown revolution at three levels: liberty, equality and the nature of legal status, marking the 
beginnings, however rudimentary, of the modern understanding of belonging and the construction of 
personhood in the eyes of the law.
5
  
This contribution uses this shift in legal understanding to extrapolate the possibility of a far-
reaching change which is one of the capacities of the law, seeking parallels in the key legal elements 
of constructing mediaeval personhood and the concept of citizenship in the European Union (EU) 
today.
6
 What we shall see is that a number of crucial presumptions concerning the legal position of a 
person in law, taken by the Member States of the EU as a given, are past their prime, as they do not 
fully — not at all in fact — overlap with the law as applied, as it mutated under the influence of the 
EU, reshaped by the Union either directly or indirectly.
7
 Moreover, such assumptions are potentially 
responsible for a distorted — if not misleading — picture of personhood in European law both at the 
supranational and at the national levels. The analogy with mediaeval developments will help us keep 
an eye on the crucial discrepancies between the law as declared and the law as applied. A mediaeval 
analogy helps to illuminate an understanding of how  the contemporary European legal system 
                                                     

 I am grateful for useful comments to Loïc Azoulai, Marija Bartl, Sherally Munshi, and the attendees of my lecture at 
Princeton European Union Programme, in the Fall of 2015 where the first draft of the chapter was presented upon the 
kind invitation of Sophie Meunier. The final version of this text will appear in L. Azoulai, E. Patatut and D. Barbou des 
Places (eds), ‘Ideas of the Person and Personhood in European Union Law’ (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2016). 
1 K Kim, Aliens in Mediaeval Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
2 Calvin’s Case 7 Coke Report 1a, 77 ER 377. 
3 Sir Francis Bacon, who won Calvin as Mr Calvin’s counsel, as cited in Kim (n 1) 195. 
4 For a superb discussion, see, Kim (n 1) 176–99. 
5 For a beautiful, intricate and convincing retelling of this story, see, ibid. 
6 For the most recent detailed analysis of EU citizenship, see, eg, the contributions in D Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship and 
Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
7 For a detailed account, see, D Kochenov, ‘Rounding up the Circle: The Mutation of Member States’ Nationalities under 
Pressure from EU Citizenship’ (2010) EUI RSCAS Working Paper No 2010/21. But see S Hall, ‘Determining the Scope 
Ratione Personae of European Citizenship: Customary International Law Prevails for Now’ (2001) 28 Legal Issues of 
Economic Integration 355. 
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approaches the human being as a person and a citizen.
8
 This chapter claims that there is a notable neo-
mediaeval turn in the legal framing of personhood in the EU, which can be traced to the same key 
features of the idea of a person in law that was altered in the era of the Calvin judgment: liberty, 
equality and community: all what being a ‘person’ in law is about. 
This sketch does not aspire to provide a full analogy between the mediaeval and the 
contemporary transformations of the understanding of personhood in law in Europe. Any such analogy 
would in all likelihood be profoundly misplaced at countless levels if taken literally. Yet, the 
illustration employed herein will make abundantly clear that we are far removed, in the Union of the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, from an understanding of citizenship which still rhetorically 
marks all the legal systems of the EU Member States and are used to legitimise the established 
organisation of power at the Member State and, consequently, also at the supranational level. The 
creation and the operation of the Union alongside a whole array of other factors, including the global 
rise of the human rights ideology
9
 and of the culture of justification as opposed to that of authority,
10
 
are responsible for the rise of accidental cosmopolitanism,
11
 in Alexander Somek’s insightful 
understanding. This triad brings about a radical revision in how the three core elements of personhood 
in law operate in Europe today. Neo-mediaevalism is thus not a result of a (nostalgic) turn to the 
remote past, but, rather, a hopeful construction of a future that moves away from an array of 
fundamental understandings coded into the legal-political framing of reality which dethroned the 
classical mediaeval approaches around half a millenium ago. 
Not merely a rondo, the story this chapter retells is rather a rondo with a variation in form, 
while its substance is about an incidental trend towards a departure from what seemed an innovation 
half a millennium ago and what is, officially, the basis for understanding citizenship and statehood in 
contemporary world. The task of this contribution is not to judge, but to document, showing how the 
legal understanding of personhood has been severely altered; first, under the influence of sovereignty 
and Christian soteriology, culminating in a total shift of paradigm of personhood in law in the 
sixteenth century and, secondly, how a contemporary shift in understanding, under the influence of, 
inter alia, the law of the European Union, provides an unexpected excursion into the past, reminiscent 
as it is of some pre-modern understandings, thus showing deep-rooted conflicts between how the 
Union operates and the classical ideology of citizenship.
12
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The section that follows describes the mediaeval 
transformation of personhood: the rise of a public law-inspired sovereignist model of the person 
marked by equality before the law and liberty for all subjects through the formation of a political 
community and submission to the sovereign by means of allegiance, which opened the age of 
modernity — not yet democracy-inspired back then — in the reading of personhood in law (section 
II). This model of personhood, building on equality before the law intertwined with a submission to 
the sovereign, is then traced into the future, up to its prestigious placement at the centre of the core 
national constitutional understandings of the ‘self’ by European states which have offered their 
‘peoples’ to the Union13 (section III). This is done only to then remind the reader of the reality of the 
legal-political functioning of personhood in the Union today — whatever the justifications or the 
standard practices used to interpret the tensions away. It is perhaps amusing to see in this context that 
                                                     
8 L Bosniak, ‘Persons and Citizens in Constitutional Thought’ (2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 9. In the 
context of the EU, see L Azoulai, ‘L’autonomie de l’individu européen et la question du statut’ (2013) EUI LAW Working 
Paper 2013/14. 
9 G Frankenberg, ‘Human Rights and the Belief in a Just World’ (2013) 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 35.   
10 M Cohen-Eliya and I Porat, ‘Proportionality and the Culture of Justification’ (2011) American Journal of Comparative 
Law 463. But see, S Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?’ (2009) 7 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 468 (for criticism). 
11 A Somek, ‘Europe: Political, Not Cosmopolitan’ (2014) 20 European Law Journal 142. 
12 On the latter, see, eg, W Kymlicka and N Wayne, ‘Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory’ 
(1994) 104 Ethics 352. 
13 The High Contracting Parties clarified in the preamble to the Treaties that they are ‘DESIRING to deepen the solidarity 
between their peoples while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions’. 
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the new individualism with all its accidental cosmopolitanism could actually be presented — 
legitimately I claim — as neo-mediaevalism. The key elements of both seem to be overlapping: in 
practice, equality is not treated as a value — not even as a starting presumption — community does 
not build on the idea of sovereignty and submission, and liberty is detached from the political realm 
and does not imply collective self-determination (section IV). The conclusion draws some lessons 
from the legal evolution of the understanding of personhood in Europe. It notes, especially, that 
officially the paradigm still has not changed: the constitutions cling to sovereignist understandings and 
are ripe with solemn proclamations, while the practice of how the law operates could not be more 
different. This practice does not find reflection — or does not find a reflection yet — in how the law of 
personhood in Europe is officially constructed. 
II. Mediaevalism and the change of the paradigm of personhood in law 
 
Although citizenship is traced to Aristotle in the popular imagination,
14
 as well as to the Romans,
15
 it 
would be more correct, with the reference to those remote times, to speak of personhood in law tout 
court. While the law definitely applied to and was shaped by an array of persons, citizenship in the 
modern understanding — either pre- or post-Marshallian16 — would be extremely difficult to apply to 
that context for a number of reasons. One of the main ones among these is that personhood in law up 
to the crucial turn which culminated more or less with the Calvin case in 1608 — what is sometimes 
referred to as ‘citizenship’ in the textbooks — was mostly private, not public in nature.17 Although 
Aristotle conceived of the citizen as — very approximately — a rightful holder of office18 and 
although all the way through Roman and mediaeval periods the possession of a certain legal status 
could imply the exercise of public functions, the paradigmatic border marking the confines of the legal 
status was based on a fundamentally different consideration, compared with the idea of citizenship — 
either with or without office — today. 
The key legal status-determining distinction, at the core of the understanding of personhood 
until well into the middle ages, was whether one was free or unfree.
19
 So, if citizenship is defined 
following Brubaker as an ‘instrument and object of closure’20 — in that it outlines the confines of the 
group keeping the ‘other’ out, while also defining such a group by formulating the rules on joining or 
leaving it — the crucial border between the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs’ is now a separation between foreigners 
and those who have a local status of citizenship: both according to a public law understanding, of 
course. The foreigner is the enemy.
21
 Such a dichotomy was not in place in the past and did not mark 
the core attributes of personhood in law until the late middle ages.
22
 The crucial border between the 
‘ins’ and the ‘outs’, which is the defining feature of personhood in law, lay in the realm of private law 
and denoted whether one was ‘free’ or ‘unfree’.23 
It goes without saying that there were plenty of locals and foreigners in this world at any 
period of its historical development, yet, as Kim convincingly demonstrates, this distinction was 
                                                     
14 eg C Johnson, ‘Who Is Aristotle’s Citizen?’ (1984) 29 Phronesis 73. 
15 AN Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship 2nd edn (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973). 
16 TH Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1950). On the 
non-applicability of Marshall’s model to the European citizenship context today, see, G de Búrca, ‘Report on the Further 
Development of Citizenship in the European Union’ (2001) Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht 39, esp 50. 
17 Kim (n 1) 1–3. 
18 Johnson (n 14) 82. 
19 Kim (n 1). 
20 R Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1992). 
21 C Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (G Schwab trans, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
22 Kim (n 1) 200 et seq. 
23 ibid, 1. 
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inconsequential for the most part, with regard to the legal construction of the law of personhood.
24
 
Indeed, while people belonged to guilds, towns, parishes and countries, the distinction between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ arose all the time without amounting, however, to the key paradigm of the legal approach 
to personhood. In the medieval period, citizenship was by definition multi-layered, without affecting, 
however, its dominant universally accepted understanding.
25
 So, while the details concerning what 
being free and unfree implied were changing gradually, from slaves to serfs, from Aristotelian 
citizens
26
 to the libertini,
27
 the core distinction driving the understanding of what it means to be a 
person in the eyes of the law clearly stayed unaltered for hundreds of years: you are either free or 
unfree, with a corresponding gradation of duties and entitlements. It is crucial in this context to 
understand that the misconception that a slave or a serf is not a person in a world marked by such a 
division, implying that only the ‘free’ would enjoy a ‘true’ personhood in law is unhelpful and does 
not correspond to reality.
28
 There were simply two different types of persons in law: the free and the 
unfree, like there are now citizens and foreigners. It is this paradigmatic opposition that mattered, 
shaping the core importance of each of the two components. Being a slave would not mean, 
necessarily, not holding an important office,
29
 just as being free would not make you King. It is the 
logic behind determining which line of separation is crucial in the eyes of the law that is important for 
us.  
 This distinction defining the legal approach to the person came with a law-supported 
worldview which is evidently very different from our own.
30
 The crucial differences were two. They 
were interrelated and equally important. The first concerned the understanding of equality and the 
second concerned the understanding of liberty. Each of the two by analogy with the core free/unfree 
distinction in the pre-modern law on personhood has no direct parallel to our contemporary 
understanding of law and society — at least not officially, as we will see. 
Liberty was a private-law concept, like the main paradigm of personhood based on private 
law: born a serf one is unfree and bound to one’s lord and his land. Once freed, one moves up a rank 
compared to one’s serf parents, but one’s liberty is still very different from that of the lord, translating 
into a radically different set of rights, privileges and entitlements, detailing whom one can sue, whom 
one can marry. The whole history of the gradual emergence of statehood and collective freedoms, 
which started in Europe with the cities, could legitimately be presented as a story of reinventing the 
private-law meaning of liberty in public law terms.
31
 The paradigmatic change in the understanding of 
liberty had to do with the emergence of the notion of sovereignty, backed by theology, responsible for 
sowing the seeds of the world of ideas, which we still inhabit today, however changed and differently 
presented is its actual form.
32
 For liberty, to quote once again from the brilliant study by Kim, ‘legal 
debate … would shift its focus from the question of “doing” to the question of “being”’.33 To do 
versus to be. ‘Doing’ is quite clear in this respect. As a serf, one can work the land, accompany one’s 
master to war and beget new serfs. One’s liberty is defined by the precise legal position of one’s 
private legal status of subjugation or freedom. A continuum of liberty thus existed: different categories 
of persons, finding themselves in different contexts of subjugation or domination would be free to do 
different things. One of the key tasks of the law, then, was ensuring justice through clarity and 
                                                     
24 ibid, 1–19. 
25 Y Blank, ‘Spheres of Citizenship’ (2007) 8 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 411. 
26 Johnson (n 14). 
27 Kim (n 1) 3 (meaning ‘freed men’). 
28 ibid, 200–02. 
29 Tilly reminds us that whole provinces of important empires could be run by slaves: C Tilly, Coercion Capital and 
European States: AD 990–1992 (London, Wiley-Blackwell, 1992) 24. 
30 JM Balkin, ‘The Proliferation of Legal Truth’ (2003) 26 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 5. 
31 Tilly (n 29). 
32 It goes without saying that the understanding of liberty went through an important intellectual evolution, which this chapter 
is not the proper venue to retell. See, eg, I Berlin, Liberty (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004). 
33 Kim (n 1) 194. 
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precision in the apportionment of liberty, ‘legal inequality [being] the essential attribute of the 
Classical notion of justice’.34 
This view of freedom is rendered obsolete once liberty turns into a yes or no question and 
ceases being a matter of making precise the degree of entitlement in each particular case.
35
 Such a 
change happened under the influence of the idea of sovereignty and Christian soteriology ‘by a close 
analogy to spiritual liberation’.36 If one can be saved, one is free and this freedom is ensured through 
one’s allegiance to the sovereign through the law of nature which is also responsible for making him 
King under the same God that (if one behaves) will open, for the chosen, the doors of heaven. One’s 
subjugation to his law and sovereignty, which is, as we learnt from Calvin, of itself based on natural 
law, is thus essential for one’s liberty. There is no place for gradations in this straightforward system.  
Keechang Kim’s illustration of the shift in the understanding of liberty through the discussion 
of Bodin’s criticism of Aristotle makes this shift crystal clear.37 Bodin, wrongly presuming that 
personhood in the law of his times had the same meaning and structure as in the times of Aristotle, 
criticised the latter for failing to make a distinction, while approaching the notion of citizenship, 
between, on the one hand, those who owe allegiance to the sovereign
38
 — whom we now would brand 
as ‘citizens’ since ultimately it does not matter who the sovereign one is bound to respect actually is: a 
large lady, a parliament, or ‘the people’39 — and, on the other hand, all others. Only the former can 
enjoy true liberty, it was argued, and this liberty — paradoxically as it sounds — was gained precisely 
through the act of submission. Since in Bodin’s time the defining borderline determining the essence 
of personhood in law moved from ‘free/unfree’ to, essentially ‘a local/a foreigner’, understood as 
‘under this King/under some other King’, liberty became an attribute of belonging — submission — to 
a particular sovereign (actually construed through the territoriality of the realm) and lost the preceding 
dominant meaning of freedom ‘to do’. Once liberty came to mean submission and, in return, the 
reception of protection from the sovereign, all those who submit are equally graced by law, 
undermining the previously established gradation of liberty. This also reflected the key idea of 
Christian soteriology well: either one will be saved or not. Noone was only saved a little bit. 
The new meaning of liberty defined through a yes or no question brought about a total 
reshaping of thinking about equality. In the legal paradigm of personhood based on the private legal 
relationship defined by one’s freedom or unfreedom, equality could not be of any moral value, since 
such a moral value would delegitimise not only the key division on which the paradigm rested, but 
also the understanding of liberty as a gradual apportionment of the freedom ‘to do’. Consequently, 
inequality, rather than equality used to be the moral ideal, emphasising the importance to apportion 
liberty precisely as the level of freedom of each individual stipulated.
40
 This understanding is all but 
strange. There is overwhelming agreement in the legal-philosophical literature that equality, as such, is 
a choice which polities make rather than any ‘natural’ way of approaching the organisation of humans 
living together, which would be the most ideologically charged way to ‘explain’ equality by appeals to 
nature — more or less what Lord Coke did in Calvin.41 Sir Isaiah Berlin, with his characteristic clarity, 
claimed that the moral reasons behind the presumption of equality — rather than instrumental 
considerations — will not and cannot be found, since ‘like all human ends [equality] itself cannot be 
                                                     
34 ibid 193 (footnote omitted). 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid 203–08. 
38 ibid, 204, relying, inter alia, on J Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Sixteenth-Century Revolution in the Methodology of Law 
and History (Columbia University Press, New York, 1963). 
39 For a convincing story of the actual articulation of the sovereign, see, eg, C Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as 
Organized Crime’, in P Evans, D Rueschemeyer and T Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back in (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1985) 169; Tilly (n 29). 
40 Kim (n 1) 193. 
41 ibid 176 ff. 
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defended or justified’.42 It is thus ‘neither more nor less “natural” or “rational” that any other 
constituent of [such ends]’.43 
Sir Isaiah’s was not a political argument about equality’s worth44 or a claim about its 
necessity.
45
 Rather, it was the acknowledgement of the fact that, in philosophy both equality and 
inequality seem to be rather thinly framed, amounting to mere societal choices, beliefs.
46
 In this sense, 
‘it is difficult to see what is meant by considering it either rational or non-rational’, continues Sir 
Isaiah.
47
 The currently dominant approach — that equality is a good thing (at least better than 
inequality
48
) — goes back to the shift in the law on personhood in the late middle ages, when the idea 
of sovereignty and allegiance de facto shaped a requirement of equality before the law among all those 
whose liberty is guaranteed, as we have seen, through submission to their sovereign master sanctioned 
by the God their sovereign master opted to declare that he believed in. 
Importantly, the new equality as a legal ideal was not supposed to extend to those who are not 
bound by the same sovereign: allegiance played a key role in this process, creating the harshest 
principle of exclusion — discrimination on the basis of nationality49 — which still holds true in the 
majority of countries around the world, to outrageously inequitable results,
50
 treated as unproblematic 
by lawyers and political theorists alike. All in all, everyone is now free and equal, as long as everyone 
is under the same sovereign. Modern theorists would re-name submission as membership of the 
political community,
51
 which does not alter the essence of the crucial boundary drawn in the realm of 
the law of personhood. The division is the same: those under this sovereign versus those under some 
other sovereign, or no sovereign at all (as defined by our law
52
). Foreigners in their foreign lands are, 
of course, usually not taken into account at all, their possible claims amounting to nothing.
53
 
Excluding them is presented as a good thing, indeed, an indispensable thing, since it protects the 
political community, read ‘the sovereign’, democracy requiring closure.54 At the same time, the 
political community is responsible for equality in the current understanding of the word — assuming 
every person’s equal worth: the circular reasoning is strong yet did not scare away Walzer and too 
                                                     
42 I Berlin, ‘Equality’ (1955–1956) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 326. 
43 ibid. 
44 Peter Westen emerged as a famed advocate of equality’s emptiness: P Westen, Speaking of Equality: An Analysis of the 
Rhetorical Force of ‘Equality’ in Moral and Legal Discourse (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1990). For well-
argued disagreements, see, eg, J Waldron, ‘The Substance of Equality’ (1991) 89 Michigan Law Review 1350; K Karst, 
‘Why Equality Matters’ (1983) 17 Georgia Law Review 245. 
45 On why such legal concepts are not ‘empty’, see, A Ross, ‘Tû Tû’ (1957) 70 Harvard Law Review 812. 
46 More specifically, Berlin speaks of the ‘belief in the general rules of conduct’: Berlin (n 42) 320. See also LP Pojman, ‘Are  
Human Rights Based on Equal Human Worth?’ (1992) 52 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 605. 
47 Berlin (n 42) 319. 
48 ibid. 
49 B Kingsbury, ‘Sovereignty and Inequality’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 599. In the context of the EU, 
see A Williams, ‘The EU, Interim Global Justice and the International Legal Order’ in D Kochenov and F Amtenbrink 
(eds), European Union’s Shaping of the International Legal Order (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013) 62. 
50 Kingsbury, ibid; A Shachar, ‘Children of a Lesser State: Sustaining Global Inequality through Citizenship Laws’ (2003) 
Jean Monnet Working Paper No 2003/03. 
51 eg M Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1983). For a general analysis: MJ Gibney, ‘The Right of Non-
Citizens to Membership’ in C Sawyer and BK Blitz (eds), Statelessness in the European Union (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press,  2011) 41. 
52 This is where all the undocumented and ‘illegal’ people come from — especially those born in the territory but not 
recognised as fully ‘in’ for whatever reason. Pre-texts for such non-recognition historically varied from marrying a 
colonial subject to belonging to the inferior race or an ethnic minority. B de Hart, ‘The Morality of Maria Toet: Gender, 
Citizenship and the Construction of the Nation-State’ (2006) 32 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 49; K Rundle, 
‘The Impossibility of an Exterminatory Legality: Law and the Holocaust’ (2009) 59 University of Toronto Law Journal 
65, 69–76; D Kochenov and A Dimitrovs, ‘EU Citizenship for Latvian Non-citizens: A Concrete Proposal’ (2015) 38 
Houston Journal of International Law 1.  
53 eg Walzer (n 51). 
54 For an enlightening discussion, see, Gibney (n 51). 
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many others to be named.
55
 The easiest is, of course, to pretend that there is only one bounded political 
community inhabiting this universe, existing in a vacuum with no neighbours: the world of TH 
Marshall and John Rawls. Our world is so different, that ignoring its crucial multiplicity is the fatal sin 
of omission virtually impossible to forgive. Forgiven or not, this thinking, conceptually endebted to 
Bodin’s criticism of Aristotle, is so much engrained and accepted as a universal norm that whatever 
happens to the foreigner does not enter our moral universe.
56
 It is not surprising, thus, that in the 
contemporary political community the foreigner has taken the legitimate place of the mediaeval serf 
and Aristotelian slave, as the discussion above demonstrates: the free/unfree duality came to be 
replaced by citizen/foreigner duality at the heart of the legal understanding of personhood.  
The shift from free/unfree to local/foreigner as the most crucial legal denominators of 
personhood was thus of a truly paradigmatic nature, changing our — or our ancestors’ — 
understanding of equality, liberty and the nature of community. The excluded and fenced out group 
has changed, just as the nature of the legal bond determining each persons’ status and entitlements: 
from private law the person meandered into public law. 
The European Union is now, at least in part, rowing back on this important late-mediaeval 
shift. Not that foreigners are treated better than usual — they are not — the bulk of citizens is treated 
differently through subjection to additional requirements before the presumption of inequality can be 
reversed, thus qualifying them as free and reaffirming their membership of the community as well as 
their worthiness of protection by law. The EU has de facto introduced the mediaeval understanding of 
liberty as a continuum between the entitlements of different relatively strictly policed categories of 
persons, while also shifting the borderline between those who are ‘in’ and those who are ‘out’: it now 
runs through the body of citizens both at the national and at the supranational level. 
III. The official EU story today: the law of as if 
 
The official story line presents the EU as very closely resembling its own Member States in terms of 
all the key principles and values, which are said to be shared between the two levels of the law as 
reflected, for instance, in Article 2 TEU (Treaty on European Union).
57
 Further perusal of the Treaties 
and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) read in the light of a textbook-
friendly self-image of the Union reveals that EU law unquestionably builds, inter alia, on the ideas of 
equality, liberty, democracy
58
 and boasts the legal definition of personhood through a clear separation 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’, ie between citizens and foreigners.59 Indeed, the ECJ built on the promise of 
the treaties in Part II TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) and Article 9 TEU and 
turned EU citizenship into a ‘fundamental status of the nationals of the Member States’.60 Even if 
                                                     
55 cf J Cohen, ‘Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos’ (1999) 14 International Sociology 
250. 
56 But see Kingsbury (n 49); Williams (n 49). 
57 On possible deviations from this default position and dealing with such deviations see, eg J-W Müller, ‘The EU as a 
Militant Democracy’ (2014) 165 Revista de estudios políticos 141; J-W Müller, ‘Should the European Union Protect 
Democracy and the Rule of Law in Its Member States’ (2015) 21 European Law Journal 141; C Hillion, ‘Overseeing the 
Rule of Law in the EU: Legal Mandate and Means’ in C Closa and D Kochenov (eds), Reinorcing the Rule of Law 
Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
58 Indeed, democracy is one of the values on which the Union together with its Member States is said to be built: Art 2 TEU. 
See also A von Bogdandy, ‘The Prospect of a European Republic: What European Citizens are Voting on’ (2005) 42 
Common Market Law Review 913. 
59 But see, D Acosta Arcarazo, ‘Civic Citizenship Reintroduced? The Long-Term Residence Directive as a Post-National 
Form of Membership’ (2015) 21 European Law Journal 200. Long-term residence glorification scholarship severely 
downplays the fact that such residence is de facto and also frequently de jure operates within the context of a given 
Member State, not the Union as such: D Kochenov and M van den Brink, ‘Pretending There Is No Union: Non-
Derivative Quasi-Citizenship Rigths of Third-Country Nationals in the EU’ (2015) EUI Working Paper LAW 2015/07. 
60 eg Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, para 31; Case C-13/99 Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091, para 82; Case C-
34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] 2 CMLR 46, para 41. 
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someone is not convinced as to how exactly this happened methodologically,
61
 this is the law.
62
 This 
new citizenship, which is a more or less well-articulated legal status by now
63
 — never mind its ius 
tractum conferral, dependent on the nationalities of the Member States
64
 — comes with a powerful 
package of rights reserved for the citizens — not aliens, ie third country nationals in the supranational 
context of EU law — and also builds on a powerful promise of equality and non-discrimination among 
all the holders of this legal status. It is thus derivative at the level of individual articulation through its 
dependence on the nationalities of the Member States, but autonomous at the level of its day-to-day 
operation, through the dependence on the Union as a supranational provider of rights.
65
 Equality seems 
to be one of the cornerstones of the status: the list of the prohibited grounds of discrimination is truly 
comprehensive,
66
 and the articulation of the day-to-day application of the non-discrimination 
provisions of primary and secondary law is growing.
67
 
 Important in this respect is that alongside a number of well-known prohibited grounds of 
discrimination traceable to the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principles of non-
discrimination in the national constitutions of the Member States, Union law also refers to the 
principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality,
68
 which became one of the beacons of 
European integration from its earliest days.
69
 This principle, although it seems natural to the majority 
of the students and practitioners of EU law, is in fact radically innovative and has only one major 
parallel in history, outside of the classical federal context,
70
 which also happens to be a truly idealistic 
one
71
 — the attempt of the revolutionary Assemblée nationale framing the notion of Frenchness in pre-
Napoleonic France, to prohibit nationality discrimination.
72
 The prohibition did not work out back then 
and the radical distinction between locals and foreigners was not in fact questioned either in the 
French context afterwards or elsewhere in Europe, thus demonstrating faithfulness to the trend which 
emerged around the time when Calvin was decided. Moreover, the idea of the nation came to be 
rooted in the distinction between the citizens and foreigners, reinforcing the principle of inequality 
between the holders of different nationalities, owing allegiance to different sovereigns, or, in 
contemporary language, once again, belonging to different political communities:
73
 even dual 
nationality would not routinely be tolerated until very recent times to ensure that the purity of the 
separation is not violated.
74
 
                                                     
61 U Šadl, ‘Case – Case-Law – Law’ (2013) 9 European Constitutional Law Review 205. 
62 T Schulz, ‘Why Being Law Matters’ (2014) King’s College London Law School Research Paper No 2014-27. 
63 For an overview, see, Kochenov (n 6). 
64 D Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and a Difficult Relationship between Status and Rights’ 
(2009) 15 Columbia Journal European Law 169. 
65 Case C-135/08 Janko Rottmann [2009] ECR I-1449, Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, para 23. 
66 This does not mean that there is no room for improvement, of course: H Meenan (ed), Equality Law in an Enlarged 
European Union: Understanding the Article 13 Directives (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
67 See, eg, the contributions in D Schiek and V Chege (eds), European Union Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative 
Perspectives on Multidimensional Equality Law (London, Routledge Cavendish, 2009). 
68 Art 18(1) TFEU. 
69 G Davies, Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Market (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2003); K 
Lenaerts, ‘Union Citizenship and the Principle of Non-Discrimination on the Grounds of Nationality’ in B Vesterdorf, N 
Fenger, & K Hagel-Sørensen (eds) Festskrift til Claus Gulmann (London, Thomson Reuters, 2006). 
70 C Schönberger, ‘European Citizenship as Federal Citizenship: Some Citizenship Lessons of Comparative Federalism’ 
(2007) 19 Revue européenne de droit public 61. 
71 European integration as such can also be presented as a messianic project: JHH Weiler, ‘Europe in Crisis: On “Political 
Messianism”, “Legitimacy” and the “Rule of Law”’ (2013) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 248. 
72 The line of exclusion and inclusion was purely ideological: J Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, 
Citizenship and the State (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
73 D Miller, On Nationality (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997). 
74 T Triadafilopoulos, ‘Dual Citizenship and Security Norms in Historical Perspective’ in T Faist and P Kivisto (eds), Dual 
Citizenship in Global Perspective: From Unitary to Multiple Membership (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 27; P 
Spiro, Beyond Citizenship: American Identity after Globalisation (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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 Given the promise of the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality, the EU 
could thus depart from the core duality marking the dominant legal paradigm of personhood in 
contemporary law, but it did not. The core distinction holds at the supranational level — the level at 
which EU citizenship is granted and operates. Non-discrimination on the basis of nationality is almost 
a tautology if applied within the confines of one status of personhood in law — however atypical this 
status might seem — thus without cutting across different statuses. In fact, such a proclamation only 
increases the sharpness of the distinction between citizens and foreigners so familiar from the 
transformation described above in that non-EU citizens are not included within the scope of the 
promised supranational law’s ‘innovation’. It appears, therefore, that the comparison with what the 
Assemblée nationale did at the end of the eighteenth century is unwarranted: EU citizenship is not a 
liberation from the idea of nationality.
75
 Rather, it is a superimposed nationality of a different level, 
which seemingly follows exactly the same key logic of exclusion as the one marking the operation of 
the citizenships of the Member States at the national level. The task of modern citizenship being to 
exclude and to justify exclusion internally and externally, the national and EU levels of the law fulfill 
this task following precisely the same blueprint and using the same criterion of exclusion, thus being 
logically indistinguishable in this regard. 
In the beginning of the internal market there was probably more room for idealism: European 
law on personhood resulting in the strict separation between EU citizens and third country nationals 
observable today is at least partly judge-made. From the very beginning the treaties spoke about 
‘workers of the Member States’76 without pointing to the fact that those who were to enjoy this status 
under (then) EEC law were supposed to hold a particular nationality.
77
 It goes without saying that the 
inclusion of nationality into the definition of a worker
78
 is profoundly problematic in the internal 
market where a number of national economies rely on guest-workers’ labour, as was the case when 
nationality came to be regarded as an essential connection between the status of a worker and the 
rights that workers would enjoy under the supranational law of the EEC.
79
 
The Court has definitely played a crucial role in preventing the EU’s possible departure from 
the exclusionary patterns of the classical post-Calvin personhood paradigm, which takes the 
distinction between citizens and foreigners as an almost presumed factor of great importance. So 
engrained was this vision that the treaties did not even need to mention nationality with regard to the 
workers’ free movement regime80 — as they did in the context of the free movement of services, for 
instance.
81
 The distinction between citizens and foreigners was deemed to be there anyway.
82
 This 
traditionalism and dogmatic approach to the scope ratione personae of EEC law resulted in the 
exclusion of all the workers holding a non-EU nationality from relying on EU-level rights, thus 
                                                     
75 In this particular context ‘nationality’ is not a value-laden term, following Miller’s insightful analysis: Miller (n 73). 
76 Now Art 45(2) TFEU. The reference to ‘workers of the Member States’ has not changed since the Treaty of Rome. 
77 For a telling account of the birth of free movement of persons law in Europe, see, W Maas, Creating European Citizens 
(Lanham MD, Rowman and Littlefield, 2007). 
78 Case 75/63 Hoekstra (née Unger) [1964] ECR 177; Case 61/65 Vaassen-Göbbels (a widow) [1966] ECR 261; Case 44/65 
Singer [1965] ECR 965; Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum [1986] ECR 2121. 
79 S Castles, ‘The Guest-Worker in Western Europe – An Obituary’ (1986) 20 International Migration Review 761. 
80 The story was probably more complex, as there are strong indication in the Treaties that the notion of ‘workers of the 
Member States’ had to acquire a territorial, rather than a nationality-based framing. For a discussion, see Kochenov (n 
64) (and the literature cited therein). 
81 Art 56 TFEU; Case C-147/91 Ferrer Laderer [1992] ECR I-4097, para 7. This is only so, of course, as long as you do not 
believe, as does Thym, for instance, touching upon this issue in his chapter in this volume, that the Court is not bound by 
the law, but, rather, by some tacit agreement between the writers of the Treaties. See, for a compelling discussion of the 
necessarily deceptive nature of originalism, however much ‘modernised’, KL Scheppele, ‘Jack Balkin Is an American’ 
(2013) 25 Yale Journal of Law and Humanities 23.  
82 For a historical scholarly debate problematising this distinction, see, DF Edens and S Patijn, ‘The Scope of the EEC 
System of Free Movement of Workers’ (1972) 9 Common Market Law Review 322; WR Bohring, ‘The Scope of the EEC 
System of Free Movement of Workers: A Rejoinder’ (1973) 10 Common Market Law Review 81. 
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making the rights-side of the internal market mostly invisible for this large group.
83
 In other words, the 
ECJ effectively reinforced the grip of the ‘band of citizen-tyrants’84 ruling over their ‘guests’ who 
work for them. 
Non-discrimination on the basis of nationality came to be interpreted in exactly the same way 
as the scope of the then Community ‘worker’ status even if the provision establishing the non-
discrimination principle does not itself limit its scope to any particular set of nationalities, confined to 
the ‘scope of the Treaties’85 instead.86 In this sense, the EEC could mark a departure from the citizen-
foreigner paradigm from the outset giving all the workers legally employed in the Member States 
supranational-level rights in the internal market, but it did not — at least not on the face of it and 
certainly not in the name of broadening the application of equality, as will be explained in more detail 
in the next part. As a consequence — and this was fully confirmed by the Treaty of Maastricht through 
making a connection between the Member State nationality of every person and her European 
citizenship
87
 — EU law on personhood seems to be a faithful continuation of the ages-old tradition 
building the notion of the person in law on the distinction between the foreigner and the citizen: no 
innovation there, submissions from the scholars
88
 and EU organs
89
 notwithstanding. Once again, one 
should not be misled by the manner through which Article 18 TFEU functions today: once EU 
citizenship is regarded as having graduated into a meaningful legal status, Member State nationalities 
in their totality virtually completely disappear under its umbrella: within the scope ratione materiae of 
EU law they cease to exist in the eyes of the supranational legal system
90
 beyond their function of 
triggering the acquisition by their holders of a status of EU citizenship, which happens automatically 
through the direct effect of the relevant Treaty provisions.
91
 The same can seemingly be said about 
what is thought of equality and liberty — only EU citizens are fully included, equal and free, all the 
‘lacking demos’92 and democratic deficit aspects of the story pointing to the EU’s natural limitations93 
as a proclaimed constitutional system
94
 notwithstanding.  
                                                     
83 Although a number of exceptions from this approach were later introduced through secondary legislation, these do not 
reverse, but rather reinforce the distinction between EU citizens and foreigners: Kochenov and van den Brink (n 59); See, 
also, the relevant Dir 2003/109 and a its very optimistic analysis: D Acosta Arcarazo, The Long-Term Residence Status 
as a Subsidiary Form of EU Citizenship (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2011). 
84 Walzer, The Spheres of Justice, as cited by Gibney (n 51) 62. 
85 Art 18(1) TFEU reads as follows: ‘Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special 
provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited’. 
86 For a sound criticism of reading a list of nationalities in the text of what is now Art 18 TFEU, see P Boeles, ‘Europese 
burgers en derdelanders: Wat betekent het verbod van discriminatie naar nationaliteit sinds Amsterdam?’ (2005) 12 
Sociaal-economische wetgeving 502. 
87 Art 8 TEC, Maastricht version. The principle remains unchanged in Arts 9 TEU and 20 TFEU. It is essential not to forget, 
in this context, that the definition of a Member State nationality deemed relevant in this context is also very narrow, 
building on the notion of ‘Member State nationals for the purposes of Community law’ – not on all the richness of the 
nationality law of the Member States concerned, as confirmed by the Court: Case C-192/99 Kaur [2001] ECR I-1237. 
88 eg D Kostakopoulou, ‘European Union Citizenship and Member State Nationality: Updating or Upgrading the Link?’, in J 
Shaw (ed), Has the European Court of Justice Challenged Member State Sovereignty in Nationality Law? (2011) EUI 
Working Paper RSCAS No 2011/62. 
89 See, most recently, European Economic and Social Committee (Rapporteur Mr Pariza Castaños) Opinion ‘A More 
Inclusive Citizenship Open to Immigrants’ (own initiative opinion) 2014/C 67/04. 
90 G Davies, ‘“Any Place I Hang My Hat?” or: Residence is the New Nationality’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 43. 
91 Arts 9 TEU and 20 TFEU. See also M Szpunar and ME Blas López, ‘Some Reflections on Nationality of Member States: 
A Prerequisite of EU Citizenship and an Obstacle to its Exercise’ in Kochenov (n 6). 
92 For a masterful contextualisation, see, G Palombella, ‘Whose Europe? After the Constitution: A Goal-Based Citizenship’ 
(2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 357. 
93 JHH Weiler, ‘Epilogue: Living in a Glass House: Europe, Democracy, and the Rule of Law’ in C Closa and D Kochenov 
(eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
94 A Somek, ‘Is Legality a Principle of EU Law?’, unpublished paper on file with the author; D Kochenov, ‘EU Law without 
the Rule of Law: Is the Veneration of Autonomy Worth It?’ (2015) 34 Yearbook of European Law. 
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All in all, even though the EU is not a state and boasts a somewhat atypical system of 
structures of democratic governance, when scrutinised from the point of view of the Member States at 
least, the citizenship it has created is in full conformity with the key modern assumption that the core 
distinction in the law of personhood lies between citizens and foreigners. In this sense, even though 
EU citizenship is, for obvious reasons, radically different from the nationalities of the Member States, 
it is much more dull and lacking in novelty, than optimists would assume.
95
 Indeed, broadly speaking 
at least, it is a federal citizenship like any other.
96
 Consequently, instead of innovating, what it does is 
merely replicate the Member States’ nationalities on a different scale. The chief added value of the 
supranational status is, then, in the fact that this replication is not complete and does not involve 
coercive molding of togetherness — demos-building.97 Consequently, the supranational status could be 
presented as more just and less authoritarian: a modern take on what a national citizenship ideal could 
be, should coercion and nationalism be excluded from it, replaced by a respect for multiplicity
98
 and a 
rights-based, as opposed to a duties-based, self-justification.
99
 The EU idea of freedom is thus not 
based on submission to a sovereign in the vein of Bodin,
100
 even if the sovereign is actually the very 
people, the demos itself,
101
 democracy implying, following Gibney’s apt characterisation, ‘the meshing 
of two ideas: that rights matter and that demos rules’.102 
EU citizenship emerges as overwhelmingly traditional in terms of the key form of exclusion it 
advocates and, simultaneously, extremely innovative — if not potentially destructive from the point of 
view of traditional democratic theory — in terms of implicitly denying the necessity of a political 
community. This is what it tacitly advocates through the promotion of liberation from ‘suffocating 
bonds’: a well-known problem addressed in a broader context by a number of writers.103 Given that 
this ‘problem’ is a natural consequence of a new role individualism seems to play in the framing of 
community while coercive togetherness is more and more difficult to justify,
104
 it actually appears that 
EU citizenship is not innovative at all on this second plane either: an ordinary replication of ordinary 
and expected features of any standard approach to nationality difficult to justify in this changing 
world.
105
 
In other words, given that the literature bemoaning institutionalised individualism’s effects on 
the ideology of demos and nationhood seems to teach the same lesson when applied to the 
supranational
106
 and to the national level
107
 — including outside of the context of the Union108 — the 
core paradigm of understanding of personhood is the same in the Member States and in the EU as a 
whole: while demos as a starting point of liberty at the complex intersection of sovereignty, 
                                                     
95 For a stimulating account of citizenship’s possible futures see, eg, D Kostakopoulou, The Future Governance of 
Citizenship (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
96 Schönberger (n 70). On the general federal context of EU law, see, O Beaud, Théorie de la fédération (Paris, PUF, 2007); 
R Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009). 
97 For a spectacular criticism of demos-afflicated constitutional patriotism theories – Kostakopoulou (n 95) 66–99. 
98 Palombella (n 92); JHH Weiler, ‘In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe’s Constitutional Sonderweg’ in JHH Weiler and M 
Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism beyond the State (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003) 18. 
99 D Kochenov, ‘EU Citizenship without Duties’ (2014) 20 European Law Journal 482. 
100 Kim (n 1) 202–08. 
101 For an insightful critique of any constitutionalism as a mechanism of oppression, see, J Tully, Strange Multiplicity: 
Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
102 Gibney (n 51) 56. 
103 Somek (n 14) 142; G Davies, ‘Humiliation of the State as a Constitutional Tactic’ in F Amtenbrink and P van den Bergh 
(eds), The Constitutional Integrity of the European Union (The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2010). 
104 C Joppke, ‘The Inevitable Lightening of Citizenship’ (2010) 51 European Journal of Sociology 9; A Badiou, Ethics: An 
Essay on Understanding of Evil (London, Verso, 2001). 
105 Joppke, ibid. 
106 Somek (n 14). 
107 Joppke (n 104). 
108 eg S Žižek, ‘Against Human Rights’ (2005) 34 New Left Review 10. 
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submission and democracy, is under attack and increasingly difficult to justify, let alone to forge, the 
abyss between citizens and non-citizens is at least as important and relevant now as it used to be 
before. Crucially, this applies equally at both levels of the law in the EU. This sameness is achieved by 
drawing the boundary of exclusion in exactly the same manner in the EU as the Member States do it: 
third country nationals are out of the picture unless they settle long-term and are on track to acquire 
the really meaningful status of citizenship,
109
 and rights as well as, crucially, equality, are distributed 
between the supranational citizens, thus marking out the confines of the community of persons with 
regard to which EU citizenship serves as an instrument of closure in the vein of Brubaker’s thinking. 
This story is not the whole truth, however: once the actual operation of EU citizenship is 
scrutinised, a somewhat different — partly pre-Calvin picture of personhood in European law 
emerges, bringing an array of problems undermining this coherent worldview at both the national and 
the supranational levels of the law.  
IV. EU’s quasi neo-mediaevalism: the law as is 
 
An inattentive observer will be satisfied with the story of personhood in EU law retold above. At a 
conceptual level, EU citizenship emerges as a largely thoughtless if not haphazard replication,
110
 
where the ambitious scale of the model cannot hide the key deficiencies of the replicated originals. 
Yet, once we start looking below the surface of EU Treaties and case-law it becomes clear, almost 
immediately, that what we are actually dealing with is a somewhat more complex story than the one of 
replication presented above. The story is also potentially far more problematic. In fact, the approach to 
personhood in law which we find in the EU seems to be radically different from what we find at the 
level of the Member States. Moreover, the Member States’ nationalities — usually presented as a 
model and the source of derivation of the status are also seriously affected by this difference.  
 The established paradigm of personhood in public law which the EU seemingly follows 
implies a strict separation between foreigners and citizens accompanied by a strong imperative of 
equality before the law in dealing with those in possession of the citizenship status, accompanied by 
the idea of liberty through sovereignty and submission – a criterion which, in its latest emanation is 
equated with democracy, the sovereign being the people. Since the people is a complex construction 
by definition,
111
 it is impossible, it seems, to reproach the EU by advancing claims that the official 
story is untenable since there is ‘no EU demos’: demoi come and go112 and could flourish or die in 
correlation with authority within given boundaries, something that the EU unquestionably enjoys.
113
 
Indeed, a demoi approach could solve this problem, rhetorically at least,
114
 allowing the EU to emerge 
as a republic, for instance.
115
 ‘Democracy talk’ usually disregards the instrumentalist nature of the 
Union, which operates in the realm of pre-set goals, turning democracy into a game of means, not 
ends, in Gareth Davies’ insightful analysis.116 Could this approach turn the citizens into a means to an 
end? A democracy of means is the most reliable way to remove the core of the legal political system 
                                                     
109 This is the core goal of Dir 2003/109 as I read it.  
110 But see A Wiener, ‘Going Home? “European” Citizenship Practice Twenty Years after’, in Kochenov (n. 6). 
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112 N Davies, Vanished Kingdoms: The Rise and Fall of Nations (New York, Penguin, 2011). 
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(2004) 7 Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 76. 
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Neo-mediaeval permutations of personhood in the European Union 
 
13 
from the realm of potential democratic contestation:
117
 precisely the opposite of what democracy 
normally stands for. There is a difference between taking one’s destiny into one’s own hands and 
taking the construction of the Internal Market into one’s own hands of course.118 Demoicracy, solving 
the demos problem for ‘European democracy’ is about the latter. This unquestionably corrupts EU 
law, unaccustomed to restraints,
119
 even if based on delegated authority. Presenting the EU in a 
democratic vein thus is a powerful ideological tool
120
 to remove any democratic contestation from the 
framing of the very core of its exercise, potentially leading to injustice.
121
 This reality, which is always 
in the shadow of the official story the textbooks rehearse, has profound implications on the actual 
framing of personhood in EU law. 
An alternative approach to finding problems and solving them would be rooted in a totally 
different kind of literature and based on a totally different attention to detail in presenting the EU’s 
day-to-day. Alexander Somek’s accidental cosmopolitanism could offer a useful starting point in this 
regard.
122
 It is descriptive in the most positive sense of the word, it does not construct castles in the sky 
in contrast to the most popular literature that fly the banners of demoicracy and legal pluralism.
123
 
Instead, it opts against interpreting away the difficulties a democracy perspective faces, the promise in 
the treaties notwithstanding.
124
 Stretched to the extremes, the story emanating from this descriptive 
understanding is that demos and democracy cannot possibly be necessary for freedom, in its 
contemporary highly individualistic understanding, since as Davies has demonstrated, it is now the 
liberation from the effects of legitimate democratic outcomes — as opposed to submission in the name 
of freedom — that is gradually becoming an element of ‘citizenship’.125 As mentioned above, rather 
than an EU-specific story, this seems to be yet another illustration of the general trend outlined, inter 
alia, by Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek.126 
This is where neo-mediaevalism enters the stage: the EU is the only functioning legal system 
in the world that is not merely paralysed — at least to some extent — by this (let us crudely call it 
‘new’) liberty’s function, which frustrates the system’s ability to choose what is good and how to do it 
together and what is not acceptable and how to fight it together, even if this generates very high costs 
for some.
127
 The EU’s core effect seems to reinforce this new understanding, by imposing serious 
limits on the operation of the legal-political systems of the Member States. The EU thus emerges as 
structurally anti-demos in that it denies the promise of equality and offers a shield against legitimate 
collective action in the name of reaching its goals, like the construction of the internal market, which 
are removed from the realm of democratic contestation. 
 The EU’s official story does not hold, not because there is no demos and there is democratic 
deficit. Rather than the difficulties with the subjective perceptions of European ‘peoplehood’ or the 
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Case against Pluralism’ in Dickson and Eleftheriadis (n 114) 77; RD Kelemen, ‘On the Unsustainability of Constitutional 
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objectively vacant place left in the system of EU law for the people of Europe,
128
 it appears we are 
now observing a shift in law away from equating freedom with democracy, through the medium of 
national unity and the double submission of the individual, which the two require: fitting the mould of 
the nation and accepting democratic outcomes which are (very often) contrary to one’s interests. The 
very starting point is that the EU is, by law, by its very design, the denial of demos-like unity among 
the people which would be legally consequential in the core fields of regulation. In this sense it is like 
any other federation. Reconciling the EU and the demoi, thus, is difficult, if not impossible. How can 
this be? 
Once we take a closer look at how EU law actually operates, it seems to be premised on the 
need to apportion liberty on the basis of persons’ actions, wealth and life-styles, not their submission 
to the sovereign (or collective self-determination), ie the status of citizenship, as the classical post-
Calvin approach would require. Belonging to the ‘non-existent’ European demos or the national-level 
demoi will not help at all, since the EU instead of favouring equality before the law, offers its law 
precisely as a tool against submission (read: collective self-determination) — the one which used to 
imply liberation, remember? — to those who do not feel like being treated like their peers in the 
national systems. This includes the deserters from both facets of the grand submission narrative: those 
who dislike the idea of being part of the nation, its demos, and those who dislike the outcomes of the 
fully legitimate operation of such a nation’s democracy. The EU thus by definition cannot offer voice 
on the core issues,
129
 since its goals are pre-set.
130
 What it does, instead, is offer exit but also to those 
who are still within their polity: exit without exiting, as it were. Such a fictitious exit is only possible 
since it is policed through the supranational level of the law; the offer of this exit emerges as the EU’s 
strategy of taming the Member States — their humiliation, after all, is the EU’s constitutional tactic, in 
Davies’ memorable phrasing.131 This turns the demoi, tenable fictions, which are perceptible and alive, 
as it were, but also necessarily fictitious by definition — the imagined communities — into untenable 
fictions in their own land, with far-reaching effects for national democracy, which are still to be 
experienced in full.   
In other words, while the core of the modern understanding of personhood in law is the 
reading of liberty as a yes or no question, as explained in the first part, this is not the understanding 
that EU law promotes. It is only at the level of proclamations that EU citizenship, as such, is about 
freedom and the enjoyment of rights. The law tells us that ‘EU citizens shall enjoy the rights … 
provided for in the Treaties’.132 Once the actual enjoyment of rights is scrutinised, an important 
correction arises, which profoundly alters the legal meaning of personhood in Europe, bringing it 
closer to the mediaeval ideal of a strict apportionment of what different people within the same society 
and under the same authority can do depending on their level of personal freedom, ascribed by law 
while taking subtle differences in their individual legal statuses into account. Asking who enjoys the 
crucial European-level rights is not merely a rhetorical question, as it would be, for instance, in the 
post-Calvin union of England and Scotland. The traditional answer is ‘the one who owes allegiance’ to 
the sovereign, ie holds the status of a subject in this monarchy or is a citizen in this democracy, should 
we project several centuries — the one who is bound by the law to the equal extent as all the co-
participants in the same national project. Belonging to a Volk with the honour it brings could be 
presented as an extreme version of this reasoning,
133
 which also knows a (more popular) strictly civic 
emanation, as embodied in the fourteenth amendment, for instance. 
                                                     
128 On the dual subjective-objective essence of the definition of nationality: Miller (n 73) ch 1. 
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130 G Davies (n 116). 
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Such an answer is never, and cannot possibly be, formulated in terms of ‘falling within the 
scope of the law’,134 which, in the EU, often stands for ‘send us your CV with a photo and we will see’ 
(whether you enjoy any citizenship rights, that is). Criticism of this situation on logical and technical 
grounds is abundant and poignant.
135
 Little attention has been paid to how this state of affairs alters the 
essence of European constitutionalism. Personalisation and individualisation of the scope of the law is 
a tragedy which several generations of EU lawyers saw unfolding,
136
 which was only made possible 
through the obscure complexity of the rules and a total removal of the EU from democratic control of 
its aims, as discussed above. Moreover, the overwhelming importance of the economic activity 
advanced
137
 in the supranational context — precisely the things the EU wants to see on your CV — 
ensures that this individualisation is almost entirely private, rather than public in nature, yet, its 
function in the EU is precisely to frame the boundary of public law. The core of your EU citizenship 
— including the essence of your rights — now depends on your employer — from a cross-border 
MacDonald’s to HSBC — as much as on your Member State. This being said, this is definitely the 
new order rather than sheer anarchy — it is this ‘being order’ that makes EU’s neo-mediaevalism so 
effective and so frightening.  
It goes without saying that ‘the scope of the law’ answer is a logical impossibility, in a legal 
system reasoning from consequences.
138
 It is not to criticise the Court, which tries admirably to infuse 
the questionable design of the EU with at least a modicum of logical coherence.
139
 Rather, 
personalising the relationship between the person and the law, this neo-mediaevalism ceases to live up 
to the ideal of generality in the law’s application to all, assumes that the status of citizenship can be 
disregarded by the public authority the belonging to which this very status is there to signify. We are 
all aware of the justifications, including respect of the Member States’ sovereignty and so forth.140 It is 
crucial to ensure, however, that the discussion of the justifications of the current situation does not 
obscure an analysis of the law Europeans now have to live under, either as demos or as demoi, which 
they are unable to change, because this is how the EU works as a republic. Let us look at our law, 
which is quite simple. 
The law’s construction — both at the national and at the EU level, as sides of the same coin — 
implies that the principle of equality before the law is missing. Like under feudalism, inequality claims 
the place as the key moral ideal: it is the just separation between those who by virtue of their actions, 
occupations, wealth or other factors, acquire a claim to a larger portion of legal protection — let us 
call it freedom — than their peers holding the same legal status. 
In fact, the same state of affairs could be restated in a slightly more radical fashion than this. It 
is common knowledge, of course, that equality is an instrument in the hands of the law, a belief,
141
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rather than a philosophically sound principle.
142
 This belief unites contemporary societies, however, 
since it seems to be corresponding particularly well to the starting position of thinking about the 
person — the citizen — and the law: equality of all (at least of all those holding the status) in the eyes 
of the authority granting the status of legal attachment to the community. In other words, equality 
becomes the starting presumption of thinking about the relationship between the persons in every 
given legal system. In the EU, this starting presumption function of equality is nowhere to be found: 
quite on the contrary, the presumption is differentiation, unless ‘falling within the scope of the law’ is 
demonstrated. 
The legal system is built in such a way that the majority of those who acquired the legal status 
of attachment to it will never be in the position to be rich enough, economically active enough, or 
simply lucky enough to be graced by the application to them of the promise of equality.
143
 The 
presumption of inequality, in their particular case, will never be rebutted and will shape the law they 
know, the rights in the Union, which they enjoy and the limits of opportunity they face, thus shaping 
their lives. Equality being the core element of personhood in law, those not capable to enter the scope 
of equality are de facto excluded from citizenship. They are on the other side of the in/out divide. 
Approached from the national level, however, the picture is probably even more problematic: 
all those lucky enough to qualify for the EU-level rebuttal of the presumption of inequality frequently 
end-up carved out from the national demos commanding a legitimate legal claim to their allegiance, 
liberated from the application of the outcomes of the democratic process at the national level to them 
and thus breaking up the idealistic story all the national constitutions are so eager to tell. Once there is 
no presumption of equality at the supranational level, it obviously cannot hold at the national level 
either, when both levels of the law claim the same persons as their citizens.
144
 
Should this presentation of the operation of EU law be correct, the Union is very effective in 
pursuing justice understood as a mediaeval apportionment of privileges best suited to a particular 
situation of each person, while the presumption is against equality before the law and the idea of 
freedom understood through democracy and equality before the law could not be more antagonistic to 
what EU law is about. Where EU justice is about apportioning privilege based on the factors having no 
relation to the legal status held by individuals, equality becomes an impossibility, since the idea is not 
limited to the scope of a particular legal system as such a legal system defines it. Rather, equality is 
about ensuring that all those possessing a legal status of attachment to the sovereign are always put on 
the equal footing vis-à-vis the law. Unlike in the middle ages — and since the times of Calvin at least 
— ‘the law favoureth not’. Importantly, this is not how EU law approaches the idea justice, since 
equality does not even serve the function of the starting presumption, as we have seen. To the 
contrary, in the EU the law will favour and promote the interests of some groups of citizens and 
downgrade and ignore the interests of others based on a highly flexible idea of the ‘scope of the law’, 
which has nothing to do at all with the status as such and is thus a rhetorical method to disown some of 
the citizens while furthering the interests of others in a legal context where equality is still on the 
books, even if it does not function as a starting presumption or, for that matter, as a principle of law.
145
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Equality, thus, is not guaranteed even at the most basic level,
146
 ie the level of uniform application of 
the rules to a given status, which seriously undermines the formal legal relevance of the latter.
147
 
The picture will not be complete before the reasons behind excluding lives from the scope of 
the law are touched upon. This has been done in the literature on a number of occasions in great detail. 
Salvation was an idea unifying and demanding equality at the time Calvin was decided. Soteriology 
was the leading field that had a direct impact on law. Those who submit to wrong Gods and 
neighbouring sovereigns will not be saved. The EU-embraced soteriology is different. Only those who 
move — actually or potentially — across the eradicated (by definition of such market) borders of the 
internal market, obtain access to the tools, within the EU’s system of legal truth — to build on Jack 
Balkin
148
 — to reverse the presumption of inequality applied to them by default by EU law. While the 
stated aim is well-known and consists in contributing to the cause of building a strong internal 
market,
149
 while the aim was once logical, it makes little sense now. To avoid one’s family’s ruin one 
has to take a bus across a non-existent border,
150
 since historically — before citizenship that is — 
moving across borders could legitimately imply economic activity benefiting us all. To cut the long 
story short, the reasons for exclusion are purely ideological and self-contained, inexplicable logically. 
The ideologies packed into the exclusionary reasoning are engrained in the system of supranational 
law to such a degree that they are non-negotiable and cannot be contested democratically. No bus 
ticket or a clear willingness on the part of the judges to believe that you might possibly buy one in the 
future — and the presumption of inequality will not be reversed.  
V. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that the approach to personhood in law in the contemporary European Union 
is both typical and atypical. To start with the typical — EU citizenship resembles much more than not 
a most ordinary nationality of any random contemporary state, thus being much less innovative and 
unique, than what many scholars have claimed. Crucially, the core paradigm of personhood in law 
seems to be — in the EU’s self-image — building on the ‘golden standard’ of the Member States and 
the key distinction between the foreigners and the citizens. The mediaeval parallel drawn in this 
chapter helped us uncover the pre-modern paradigm of personhood in law, the one which does not 
know Bodinean sovereignty, allegiance and, by extension, democracy and opposes the idea of 
equality. The core distinction at the heart of such legal paradigm of personhood is between the free 
and unfree; the core moral value — the precise apportionment of liberty among the persons in 
accordance with their legally recognisable chance and circumstance. This paradigm of personhood, 
which is private, not public in nature, almost became extinct with the advent of democracy, equality, 
and the status of citizenship based on the citizen/foreigner distinction is what the EU is now forcefully 
reviving. The fact that this is undoubtedly inadvertent does not alter the outcomes of this process. In 
EU law as it stands borders of presumed inequality run through societies, the starting assumption in 
the law of personhood is that of the desirability of the apportionment of liberty. Lastly, collective self-
determination en par with the submission to the sovereign is frowned upon in an atmosphere where 
democratic contestation of ends, which the legal system is striving to achieve is both de jure and de 
facto impossible. Due to this neo-mediaevalism, the EU’s approach to personhood is actually much 
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more atypical than many scholars have claimed. Through the developments described above the EU is 
drifting in a dangerous direction of extinguishing the classical ideas of self-determination and human 
worth in public law tout court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
